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CHAPTER 19 
Workmen's Compensation 
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY 
A. DECISIONS 
§19.1. Maritime injury: Federal-state remedies. The doctrines of 
"local concern," 1 "twilight zone" 2 and "maritime but local" 8 have 
again risen their spectral heads to haunt the compensation attorney. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Calbeck4 and Donovanl> 
cases again interpreted Section 3 (a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act.6 This act, like state workmen's compen-
sation acts, operates under the theory that industry, rather than the 
employee, is in the best position to sustain the economic loss of personal 
injury and death. 
In the Calbeck and Donovan cases as reported by the Supreme Court 
of the United States on June 4, 1962, the question arises whether the 
jurisdictional dilemna that was laid to rest by Davis7 has now come 
back to torment the practitioner. In Calbeck, the employee, Roger 
McGuyer, was a welder in the employ of the Levingston Shipbuilding 
Company, which owns and operates a shipyard on the navigable Sabine 
River, between Orange, Texas, and Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. Mc-
Guyer worked both on the repair of completed vessels and on vessels 
under construcion. He was injured while working on an uncompleted 
drilling barge which had been launched and was floating on the Sabine 
River while its superstructure was under construction. In the Donovan 
case the employee, Minus Aizen, was also a welder. His employer was 
Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., which operates two shipyards near New 
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY is a partner in the firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley Be 
White, Boston. 
§19.1. 1 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 Sup. Ct. 89, 66 L. Ed. 210 
(1921). 
2 Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington, 317 
U.s. 249,63 Sup. Ct. 225, 87 L. Ed. 246 (1942). 
8 Grant Smith·Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed. 
!l21 (1922). 
4 Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 82A Sup. Ct. 1196, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
!l68 (1962). 
I> Donovan v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., decided in the same opinion as Calbeck, 
note 4 supra. 
6!13 U.S.C. §§901-950 (1958). 
7 Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington, !l17 
U.S. 249, 6!1 Sup. Ct. 225,87 L. Ed. 246 (1942). 
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Orleans. Aizen had worked only on new construction although fellow 
employees worked both on new construction and repair work. He 
was injured while welding on an oil drilling barge which had been 
launched and was floating on the navigable waters of the Mississippi 
River while its construction was being completed. 
In each of these two cases the petitioner is a Deputy Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, who based an award of com-
pensation under the act on findings that the employee was engaged at 
the time of his injury in the work of completing the construction of 
a vessel afloat on navigable waters. In sustaining the award under the 
act the Supreme Court said in part: 
Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power 
so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by em-
ployees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury 
might also have been within the constitutional reach of the state 
workmen's compensation law .... 
In sum, it appears that the Longshoremen's Act was designed 
to ensure that a compensation remedy' existed for all injuries sus-
tained by employees on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty 
as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy. Section 3(a) 
should, then, be construed to achieve these purposes.s 
The Court in essence held that shipyard workers employed on a vessel 
undergoing construction on the navigable waters of the United States, 
or for that matter on any dry dock, are entitled to benefits of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Prior to this 
decision it was generally thought that persons engaged in new ship 
construction were not within the purview of the act. 
It is readily understandable why the claimants in the present cases 
desired to come under the act. Maximum payments for Aizen under 
the Louisiana Compensation Act would be $14,000, whereas under the 
Longshoremen's Act he would be entitled to $50 a week for life. He 
was permanently disabled at the age of twenty-five and should he live 
his full life expectancy of approximately forty-eight additional years he 
would receive $134,784, or over $120,000 more than he would receive 
under the applicable state act. McGuyer's widow under the Texas 
Workmen's Compensation Act would have been entitled to a gross 
amount of $12,600. Under the Longshoremen's Act, however, if she 
did not remarry and lived her normal life expectancy the approximate 
amount due would be $83,500. 
In 1927, in order to provide an injured longshoreman or harbor 
worker compensation, Congress passed an act to provide for the pay-
ment of compensation for injuries or death occurring on navigable 
waters of the United States. Section 3(a) provides: 
S !l70 U.S. 114, 117, 124, 82A Sup. Ct. 1196, 1198, 1202, 8 L. Ed. 2d 368, 371, 375 
(1962). 
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Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of 
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or 
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters 
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for 
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceed-
ings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation 
shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of-
(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person 
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel 
under eighteen tons net; or 
(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency 
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political 
subdivision thereof. 
The origin of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act can 
be traced directly to the action of some states in applying their state 
acts to longshoremen and harbor workers injured on vessels in navi-
gable waters. Prior to the enactment of the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Act in 1927 the states in order to prevent injured 
employees from being without a remedy evolved the "local" doctrine 
to circumvent the harsh result of Southern Pacific Co. v. jensen.1I In 
that case the employee was driving a lumber cargo loader across a 
gangway to the vessel's hold. The accident occurred when Jensen 
was driving his truck from the vessel onto the gangway. The employee 
was killed on shipboard, and, therefore, his employment was maritime. 
His beneficiaries sought compensation under the New York Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The Supreme Court in reversing New York, which 
awarded compensation, said: 
The work of a stevedore, in which the deceased was engaging, is 
maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; 
the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the 
rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were 
matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction.lo 
The first breach in the jensen doctrine was the Garcia case.ll Here 
the employee was doing longshoremen's work in the hold of a vessel. 
The holding was distinguished from jensen by finding the injury was 
maritime in nature but local in character. The "maritime but local" 
doctrine was finalized in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde.12 
The Supreme Court, in 1942, evolved a new doctrine. The Davis 
caselS involved an iron worker who was killed when he fell from a barge 
into navigable waters. His beneficiary filed a claim under the Wash-
ington Compensation Act. The Washington Supreme Court rejected 
11244 u.S. 205, 57 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917). 
10244 u.S. at 217, 57 Sup. Ct. at 529, 61 L. Ed. at 1099. 
11 Western Fuel Co. v. Garda, 257 u.S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 89, 66 L. Ed. 210 (1921). 
12 257 u.S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157,66 L. Ed. 521 (1922). 
18 Davis v. Department of Labor Be Industries of the State of Washington, 517 U.S. 
249, 65 Sup. Ct. 225, 87 L. Ed. 246 (1942). 
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the claim. The United States Supreme Court in reversing the state 
court said: 
Harbor workers and longshoremen employed "in whole or in part 
upon the navigable waters" are clearly protected by this Federal 
Act; but, employees such as decedent here occupy that shadowy 
area within which, at some undefined and undefinable point, state 
laws can validly provide compensation .... 
It must be remembered that under the Jensen hypothesis, basic 
conditions are factual: Does the state law "interfere with proper 
harmony and uniformity of" maritime law? Yet employees are 
asked to determine with certainty before bringing their actions 
that factual question over which courts regularly divide among 
themselves and within their own membership. As penalty for 
error, the injured individual may not only suffer serious financial 
loss through the delay and expense of litigation, but discover that 
his claim has been barred by the statute of limitations in the 
proper forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere. . .. 
The horns of the jurisdictional dilemma press as sharply on 
employers as on employees. In the face of the cases referred to 
above, the most competent counsel may be unable to predict on 
which side of the line particular employment will fall. . . . 
There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight 
zone in which the employees must have their rights determined 
case by case, and in which particular facts and circumstances are 
vital elements. That zone includes persons such as the decedent 
who are, as a matter of actual administration, in fact protected 
under the state compensation act.14 
Again in Hahn v. Ross Island Sand &- Gravel CO.lli the twilight zone 
doctrine was commented upon with approval. In effect this doctrine 
told injured employees that in doubtful cases " ... he would be as-
sured of workmen's compensation whether he proceeded under a state 
workmen's compensation act or the federal statute." 16 The question 
left unanswered by these cases is, what factual situation falls within 
the "twilight zone"? A Massachusetts decision by Chief Justice Qua 
in Moores's Case17 recognized the futility of attempting to reason logi-
cally about the ramifications of the "twilight zone." The principle 
question raised by Moores related to the applicability of the state 
compensation law. The claimant when injured was working at the 
shipyard of the self-insurer on a 475-foot tanker chartered by the 
United States Government. The employee's work was variously on 
piers, dry docks and ships at the self-insurer's plant, at which he was 
classified as a "rigger." The employee was injured when he slipped 
while giving signals to a crane operator. At the time of the injury 
14 lI17 V.S. at 25l1·256, 611 Sup. Ct. at 227·229, 87 L. Ed. at 248·250. 
15 lI58 V.S. 272. 79 Sup. Ct. 266. II L. Ed. 2d 292 (1959). 
16358 V.S. at 274. 79 Sup. Ct. at 268. 3 L. Ed. 2d at 294 (separate opinion). 
17323 Mass. 162. 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948). 
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the claimant was on board a completed vessel undergoing extensive 
repairs on a dry dock, floating in navigable waters adjacent to a pier 
to which it was fastened. Massachusetts workmen's compensation law 
covers all longshore maritime injuries not excluded by the constitu-
tional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the United 
States.18 Since the decision in Jensen19 it was necessary to observe 
carefully the line of demarcation between state and federal authority. 
In affirming the decision of the Industrial Accident Board which 
awarded benefits to the employee, Chief Justice Qua said in part: 
It would seem, therefore, that although apparently some heed 
must still be paid to the line between State and Federal authority 
as laid down in the cases following the Jensen case, the most im-
portant question has now become the fixing of the boundaries of 
the new "twilight zone," and for this the case gives us no rule or 
test other than the indefinable and subjective test of doubt. . . . 
Probably therefore our proper course is not to attempt to reason 
the matter through and to reconcile previous authorities, or to 
preserve fine lines of distinction, but rather simply to recognize 
the futility of attempting to reason logically about "illogic," and 
to treat the Davis case as intended to be a revolutionary decision 
deemed necessary to escape an intolerable situation and as designed 
to include within a wide circle of doubt all water front cases involv-
ing aspects pertaining both to the land and to the sea where rea-
sonable argument can be made either way, even though a careful 
examination of numerous previous decisions might disclose an 
apparent weight of authority one way or the other. We can see 
no other manner in which the Davis case can be given the effect 
that we must suppose the court intended it should have, and we 
must assume that the court intends to follow that case in the 
future.2o 
Several interesting but yet unanswered questions arise as a result of 
the decision in Cal beck and Donovan. If a secretary who spends prac-
tically all of her working hours at an office desk is sent to deliver a mes-
sage to another employee who is working on a vessel under construction 
and is injured, is her exclusive remedy under the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Act? Again, if the owner of a small sporting goods 
store in Springfield sends his handyman to scrape the bottom· of his 
boat that is in the local dry dock and the handyman falls into a local 
navigable river and is less handy at swimming than at scraping, is the 
handyman's widow's sole remedy under the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Act? 
To summarize the several doctrines including Section 3(a), as at-
tempted above, is at worst foolhardy and at best fraught with danger. 
18 Lauzon's Case, 302 Mass. 294, 295, 19 N.E.2d 51, 52 (1939). 
19 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086 
(1917). 
20 323 Mass. 162, 167, 80 N.E.2d 478, 480-481 (1948). 
5
Shaughnessy: Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
§19.2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 267 
Few of the commentators can agree.21 The meaning of 33 U.S.C. 
§903(a) is far from being a question of first impression. In the thirty-
five years since its enactment this provision has been before the United 
States Supreme Court many times. For the guidance of the practi-
tioner, the Deputy Commissioner in this area has taken the position 
that he has jurisdiction of injuries on all incompleted vessels afloat, 
as well as marine railways and dry docks. It is the feeling of the United 
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, that 
jurisdiction has been given to this division of all shipyards in Massa-
chusetts who repair or construct boats or are engaged in any of the 
related activities such as demolition, painting, caulking and other 
functional supplementary matters. 
§19.2. Action against third person. Farrell's Case1 in essence al-
lowed a double recovery for the widow. The facts, agreed to before 
the Industrial Accident Board, were substantially as follows: The em-
ployee on July 2, 1958, sustained injuries arising out of the course of 
his employment when struck while on the public way by an automobile 
owned and operated by one Malinowski. The injuries resulted in 
Farrell's death on July 3, 1958. The employee was survived by two 
dependents. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company was the 
carrier of both the workmen's compensation insurance of Farrell's 
employer and the automobile liability insurance of Malinowski, with 
a coverage limit of $20,000 for the injury or death of one person in one 
accident. The compensation insurer paid benefits under the act to the 
dependents and sought an offset. 
Hartford, as a compensation insurer, did not bring an action against 
the third party, Malinowski, within nine months. The dependent 
widow, as executrix, brought such action, and the jury in Superior 
Court returned a verdict of $25,735 on Count I (conscious suffering) and 
$13,780 on Count II (death). The executrix, before entry of judg-
ment, agreed to accept $20,000 in full payment for damages and to re-
lease Malinowski from all further liability. Hartford, as the liability 
insurer, agreed to pay, and has paid, the entire amount of its coverage 
($20,000) and, as the compensation insurer, agreed to waive recovery 
of all payments made by it under G.L., c. 152, prior to March 11, 1960, 
the date of execution of the stipulation and agreement for entry of 
judgment. 
The single member in his findings ruled that the action taken by the 
executrix did not in any way affect or relieve the obligation of the 
workmen's compensation insurer to pay the dependent widow benefits 
under G.L., c. 152, §31. His order that the insurer continue the pay-
ments of dependency compensation was affirmed by the reviewing 
212 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §§89.00·89.60 (1952); Horovitz, 
Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws 21-33 (1944); Rodes, Work-
men's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 
Harv. L. Rev. 637, 638-639 (1955); Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the Mari-
time Law, 38 Yale L.J. 472, 500 (1929); Comment, 67 id. 1205, 1210-1211 (1958). 
§19.2. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 959, 183 N.E.2d 302. 
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board. The insurer appealed from the decree entered in the Superior 
Court that the dependency payments be made in accordance with the 
board's decision. 
In affirming the decree of the Superior Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court assumed, since there was no need to decide the point, that under 
G.L., c. 152, §15, the insurer is entitled to full reimbursement from 
the proceeds of the law action against the third party before the claim-
ant may recover any part. The Court held, however, that the rights of 
the insurer are affected by the stipulation under which the lump sum 
was made. This provided: 
Whereas the executix has agreed to accept twenty thousand dollars 
in full payment for damages and to release the defendant from all 
further liability; ... Hartford . . . will pay to the executrix the 
sum of twenty thousand dollars, of which thirteen thousand seven 
hundred eighty dollars is for the death, and six thousand two hun-
dred twenty dollars is for conscious suffering; . . . Hartford . . . 
agrees to waive recovery of all payments made to date under c. 152 
of the General Laws ... 2 
Section 15 expressly provides that the hearing on the merits of the 
settlement is a time for the determination of "the amount, if any, to 
which the insurer is entitled out of such settlement by way of reim-
bursement . . ." The Court held that the settlement stipulation was 
to be construed in the light of this provision. The executrix gave up 
her rights against the defendant, and in view of the verbiage in the 
stipulation agreement the Court held that Hartford was not entitled 
to offset the $20,000 against future compensation. 
If the defendant, Malinowski, was in fact impecunious it would 
appear that the executrix not only had her cake, but was able to enjoy 
every morsel of it. 
It is unlikely that such a factual situation will again arise. In 
Farrell, the Court held the insurer to what was not actually in the 
stipulation but must have been understood by the parties, i.e., work-
men's compensation benefits would not be paid until after that number 
of weeks when $20,000 would have been paid had passed. A more 
careful drafting of settlement stipulations in the future will prevent the 
harsh rule of the present case. 
§19.8. Incapacity. In Dimitropoulos's Case,l the employee, more 
than twenty years ago, was involved in an accident as a result of which 
his right eye was enucleated. On August 24, 1957, while in the course 
of his employment he received a blow on the head. Shortly there-
after his vision in his left eye became impaired, and a medical exami-
nation revealed that he had a detached retina. On September 7, 1957, 
an operation was performed to remedy this condition; as a result 
"vision was 20/30, corrected, the retina was in situ and the eye looked 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 961, 183 N.E.2d at 304-. 
§19.3. 1 S43 Mass. 341,178 N.E.2d 497 (1961). 
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very good." The only impairment in vision after the operation was 
the result of a pre.existing cataract which was in no way related to 
the employee's injury on August 24. After finding the foregoing facts, 
the single member found that the employee was totally incapacitated 
from September 3, 1957, to January 27, 1958, and partially incapaci-
tated from January 28, 1958, to March 31, 1958, and awarded total and 
partial incapacity compensation respectively for these periods. With 
respect to compensation following March 31, 1958, the single member 
found that the employee's incapacity was not owing to any injury aris-
ing out of and in the course of his employment. 
The reviewing board, with a modification, affirmed the findings of 
the single member and the award of compensation made by him. The 
board modified the decision of the single member "by specifically 
reserving the employee's right to further compensation following 
March 31, 1958, when they were terminated by the single member." 
There was no appeal from this decision. 
Pursuant to the modified decision a second hearing was held before 
another single member. This hearing was limited to the issue of im-
pairment of earning capacity subsequent to March 31, 1958. In es-
sence the single member found that the employee did not have any 
disability subsequent to March 31, 1958, that was causally related to an 
injury of August 24, 1957. The single member, accordingly, denied 
compensation. 
The reviewing board affirmed the decision of the single member 
with a modification. The reviewing board found in accordance with 
the testimony of a qualified ophthalmologist that "since the employee 
had a detached retina in his only eye . . . he should avoid heavy work 
and work of the nature ... he was performing at the time of his 
injury ... because of the physical danger that might result to this 
eye in performing work of a heavy nature." 2 Concluding, the board 
found that "since this employee because of the injury to his left eye 
is restricted to doing work of a light nature and of a type not likely 
to reinjure ... [that] eye ... his earning capacity, because of his 
restriction to such types of work, is reduced." 3 The board awarded 
partial incapacity compensation under Section 35 from March 31, 
1958. 
Upon certification to the Superior Court by the insurer a decree 
was entered in accordance with the board's decision. From this decree 
the insurer appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that a finding of partial incapacity 
is warranted when an employee, under competent medical advice, re· 
frains from engaging in his former work because of a considerable 
risk of reinjury, and pursues less remunerative work in order to avoid 
that risk. The Court pointed out that the finding of the single mem· 
ber, adopted by the board, that the employee's sight was "as good as 
2 !l4!1 Mass. at !!4!!, 178 N.E.2d at 499. 
a Ibid. 
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before the injury and that he could do his regular work, but with the 
possibility of another accident if he overexerted," did not compel a 
finding of no incapacity on the ground that the employee is physi-
cally able to do his former work. 
There was apparently no Massachusetts decision precisely on point, 
but according to the Court it had been considered elsewhere. The 
case of Williams v. Lancasters Steam Coal Collieries, Ltd.4 was cited 
by the Court as supporting its decision. In that case, a hewer, who was 
about fifty years of age, was in 1923 certified to be suffering from 
miner's nystagmus. He received compensation for total incapacity 
until 1924, when he resumed work on the surface at lower wages and 
was paid partial compensation. In 1927 he returned to work under-
ground, but in 1934 was again certified to be suffering from miner's 
nystagmus and received partial compensation. On May 4, 1939, com-
pensation was suspended by the employer on the grounds that the 
medical practitioner had certified on that date that the employee was 
fit to resume his ordinary work. The employee filed for further com-
pensation. The lower court held that the medical evidence indicated 
there was a reasonable probability that incapacity might ensue from 
work underground and it thus was not suitable employment for the em-
ployee. An award was made for the resumption of compensation from 
May 4, 1939. 
The word "incapacity" as found in Sections 34, 34A and 35 of G.L., 
c. 152, has been defined on innumerable occasions by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. In Evans's Case it was said: "It is settled that, with 
certain exceptions which are immaterial here, compensation under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is awarded for impairment of earning 
capacity and not for injury as such.":; Again in Zeigale's Case it was 
said: "Compensation is awarded not for the injury as such but rather 
for an impairment of earning capacity caused by the injury." 6 It 
is axiomatic that an employee seeking an award of compensation must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence the nature and extent of his 
incapacity.7 It has also been held that an employee's inability to ob-
tain work resulting directly from his injury is an "incapacity for 
work" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.S 
Dimitropoulos was hired by his employer with knowledge of his 
physical impairment. An insurer takes the employee in the condition 
in which it finds him and is bound to compensate him according to 
the provisions of the act for incapacity resulting from any compensable 
injury recorded during the period covered by the policy.9 Whether 
an employee has been incapacitated is a question of fact, and when 
there is evidence to justify the finding of the Industrial Accident Board 
4 1I11 B.W.C.C. 75. 
6299 Mass. 4115, 436, III N.E.2d 27, 28 (19118). 
61125 Mass. 128, 129-130,89 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1949). 
7 Davis's Case, liM Mass. 530, 24 N.E.2d 541 (19119). 
8 Lacione's Case, 227 Mass. 269, 116 N.E. 485 (1917). 
9 Evans's Case, 299 Mass. 4115, III N.E.2d 27 (1938). 
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reversing the decision of the single member, its finding is not subject 
to review on the merits.10 Dr. Yasuna, an ophthalmologist, testified 
on behalf of Dimitropoulos as follows: 
My opinion that an individual such as this who has had [a] de-
tached retina which has been operated [on], in this case relatively 
successfully, shoUld not engage from then on in any heavy work 
whatsoever. . .. Any patient who has had a retinal detachment 
should be limited to light work. . .. The reason for saying that 
is [that] the patient has had a retinal detachment and is prone to 
have another detachment which can certainly be brought on more 
so by having a strain, heavy lifting or further injury to his eye or 
head. . .. The possibility of a recurrence in an only eye is even 
higher than 25%, maybe as high as 50% if exposed to heavy lifting 
work.11 
There was evidence in Dr. Yasuna's testimony as to incapacity. It is 
well settled that findings of fact by the board are final if there is 
any evidence to support them.12 And it is equally well settled that 
the decision of the reviewing board cannot be reversed unless required 
as a matter of law.13 
The Supreme Judicial Court in affirming the decision of the board 
in awarding partial incapacity compensation may have given the board 
another Pandora's box. The Court held that the medical testimony, 
together with the serious consequences which might ensue if the em-
ployee resumed his former type of work, justifies the award of partial 
compensation. Who can say that an employee who had a back injury 
may not sustain further difficulties on return to work; or the claimant 
with dermatitis may not cause a fresh outbreak on his return to work; 
or the coronary patient may not sustain another occlusion. If the state 
and federal "Hire the Handicapped" program is to have the full coop-
eration of industry in the future, the board will have to weigh care-
fully what results may reasonably ensue on an injured employee's re-
turn to work. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§19.4. Appeal on rates. General Laws, c. 152, §52D, has been 
amended by Acts of 1962, c. 299, which allows any insured to obtain 
all information relative to a rate established for that insured. Any 
party affected by the action of any rating organization or insurer may 
appeal to the Commissioner of Insurance, who will provide a hearing. 
§19.5. Increase in weekly benefits for specified injuries. Acts of 
1962, c. 471, makes a number of substantial changes in G.L., c. 152, 
§36. In case of the following specified injuries the sum of $20 a week 
10 Donovan's Case, 243 Mass. 88, 137 N.E. 34 (1922). 
11343 Mass. 341, 344 n.l, 178 N.E.2d 497, 499 n.l (1961). 
12 Chapman's Case, 321 Mass. 705,707,75 N.E.2d 433, 435 (1947). 
13 McCann's Case, 286 Mass. 541, 543, 190 N.E. 725 (1934). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1962 [1962], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1962/iss1/22
272 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §19.5 
shall be paid in addition to all other compensation for the following 
periods: 
(a) For the loss by enucleation or otherwise, or the total loss of use 
of both eyes, a period of five hundred weeks. 
(b) For the reduction to twenty seventieths of normal vision in both 
eyes, with glasses, a period of five hundred weeks. 
(c) For the reduction to twenty seventieths of normal vision in one 
eye, with glasses, a period of two hundred weeks. 
(d) For the loss by enucleation or otherwise, or the total loss of use 
of one eye, or for injury to one eye which produces an inability which 
is not correctible to use both eyes together for single binocular vision, 
a period of two hundred weeks. 
(e) For any permanent but partial reduction in either the acuity 
or field of vision of either eye, such period of weeks in proportion to 
the period applicable in the event of total loss, total loss of use, or the 
reduction to twenty seventieths of normal vision of one or both eyes 
as the partial reduction bears to such total loss, total loss of use or re-
duction to twenty seventieths of normal vision. 
(f) For the loss of hearing of both ears, four hundred weeks. 
(g) For the loss of hearing of one ear, one hundred and fifty weeks. 
(h) For the bodily disfigurement the number of weeks which, ac-
cording to the determination of the industrial accident board, review-
ing board or single member, is a proper and equitable compensation, 
not to exceed two hundred and twenty weeks, which sum shall be pay-
able in addition to all other sums under this section wherever the 
same shall be applicable. 
(i) For loss of bodily functions or sense other than hearing and 
sight the number of weeks which, according to the determination of the 
board, reviewing board or single member, is a proper and equitable 
compensation, not to exceed one hundred and seventy-five weeks. 
(j) For loss by severance of the right or major arm at the shoulder, 
a period of two hundred and twenty-five weeks. 
(k) For loss by severance of the left or minor arm at the shoulder, 
a period of two hundred weeks. 
(I) For loss by severance of the right or major hand at the wrist, a 
period of one hundred and seventy-five weeks. 
(m) For loss by severance of the left or minor hand at the wrist, a 
period of one hundred and fifty weeks. 
(n) For the loss by severance of either leg at the hip, a period of two 
hundred weeks; for the loss by severance of both legs at the hip, a 
period of five hundred weeks. 
(0) For the loss by severance of either foot at any point above the 
ankle joint, a period of one hundred and fifty weeks; for the loss by 
severance of both feet at any point above the ankle joint, a period of 
three hundred and fifty weeks. 
(P) For such periods in the case of an arm or a leg, that if either 
is amputated at or above the elbow or the knee it or they will be 
treated as though at the shoulder or the hip; but if amputated below 
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the elbow or the knee it or they will be treated as though at the ankle 
or the wrist. 
(q) If the member, whether leg, foot, arm or hand, is not lost by 
severance, but is so injured as to be permanently incapable of use, for 
the same number of weeks as though it were severed; provided, how-
ever, that if the loss of use is less than total, then for such period of 
weeks in proportion to the period applicable in the event of total loss 
of use of said leg, foot, arm or hand as the functional loss bears to the 
total loss of use of such leg, foot, arm or hand. 
(r) If the fingers, toes or other parts of the hand or foot have been 
severed or permanently rendered incapable of use, such period of weeks 
in proportion to the period applicable in the event of total loss or 
total loss of use of said hand or foot as the functional loss arising out 
of said severed or inutile part of said hand or foot bears to the total 
loss or loss of use of the same. 
(s) For loss by severance of both hands at the wrist, a period of four 
hundred weeks. 
(t) For loss by severance of both arms at the shoulder, a period of 
five hundred weeks. 
The weekly payments provided for the act may at the discretion 
of the board or any member thereof be paid to the employee in a bulk 
sum. The act specifically provides that compensation payable under 
it is not to affect adversely the employee'S right to compensation under 
Section 36 or any other section of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
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